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Abstract
This article discusses the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act by the United States 
Congress, the enactment of sentencing guidelines by the South Korean legislature, and the 
effects of these enactments on the U.S. and on South Korea. The Sentencing Reform Act in the 
U.S. was the culmination of almost a decade of hearings, committee mark-ups and floor 
consideration in the U.S. Congress which begun in 1976 with the introduction of a bill by 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy authorizing the appointment of a commission for the purpose of 
promulgating sentencing guidelines for court consideration. After enactment in 1984, for over 
twenty years sentencing power was gradually consolidated into the federal prosecutor’s office 
until in 2005 the United States Supreme Court in a landmark decision deemed unconstitutional 
the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines. However, as the United States Supreme 
Court was ending the twenty year legislative experiment in mandatory sentencing, the South 
Korean legislature was beginning the process of enacting legislation that would lead to strict 
sentencing guidelines for South Korea.
The historical background and current approaches of South Korea and the United States 
in the sentencing guideline area are of interest to prosecutors, the judiciary and public 
defenders in South Korea. The bulk of the article focuses on the U.S. experience as a guide for 
the South Korean judiciary, especially due to the current divergence between the U.S. and 
South Korea in this area. While the United States judicial system is moving decisively towards 
a system giving greater discretion to the judiciary, South Korea is moving decisively towards a 
sentencing system giving greater power to the prosecution. In analyzing this divergence, this 
article presents the original reasons behind mandatory sentencing in the United States, the 
long debate in the United States as to the efficacy of mandatory sentencing and the current 
course charted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The article also briefly presents and discusses the 
history of sentencing guidelines in South Korea, and discusses whether the U.S. experience 
can be informative in the debate as to whether sentencing guidelines are suitable for the issues 
currently facing South Korea.
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In March 2004 pursuant to U. S. federal sentencing guidelines, Jamie 
Olis, a Korean-American, received a 24-year sentence for his relatively 
minor role in a financial scandal. During the same time period, the Judicial 
Review Committee (“JRC”) in South Korea recommended the adoption of 
sentencing guidelines to enhance the public‘s faith in the Korean judicial 
system. On October 4, 2004 in the United States Supreme Court oral 
arguments in the case of U.S. v. Booker1) regarding the constitutionality of 
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines were heard, and, on January 12, 
2005, the court ruled that mandatory federal sentencing guidelines were 
unconstitutional. In December of 2004, in order to implement the 
recommendations of the JRC, including the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines, the South Korean government established the Presidential 
Committee for Judicial Reform.
During the next three years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit 
Courts, in a series of decisions, reversed and revised 20 years of legislative 
enactments and returned discretion in sentencing decisions to the U.S. 
federal judges. During the same three years in South Korea, the South 
Korean National Assembly worked to establish a sentencing commission 
within the South Korean judiciary and, on May 2, 2007, the South Korean 
Supreme Court, pursuant to an amended Court Organization Act, 
established a sentencing commission to implement fair and objective 
sentencing practices in South Korea.2)
This article will explore the historical background on the present 
divergent courses of South Korea and the United States in the sentencing 
guideline area. At a time when the United States, after a 20 year experiment 
with sentencing guidelines, is moving decisively towards a system giving 
greater and greater discretion to the judiciary, South Korea is moving 
decisively towards a sentencing system giving greater power to the 
prosecution. In analyzing this divergence, this article will present the 
original reasons behind mandatory sentencing in the United States, the long 
debate in the United States as to the efficacy of mandatory sentencing and 
the current course charted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The article will also 
1) 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2) Beopwon jojik beop [Court Organization Act], Act. No. 51, Sept. 26, 1949, amended by 
Act. No. 8411, May 1, 2007 (S. Kor.).
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briefly present and discuss the history of sentencing guidelines in South 
Korea, and discuss whether the U.S. experience can be informative in the 
debate as to whether sentencing guidelines are suitable for the issues 
currently facing South Korea.
I. The United States
1. The Roots of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
In 1984 the United States Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act 
(hereinafter “SRA”) as Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.3) 
The SRA was the culmination of over a decade of hearings, committee 
mark-ups and floor consideration in the U.S. Congress which began in 1976 
with the introduction of a bill by Senator Edward M. Kennedy authorizing 
Judicial Conference appointment of a commission for the purpose of 
promulgating sentencing guidelines for court consideration.4) Senator 
Kennedy, in introducing the 1976 bill, stated that this was “the beginning of 
a concerted legislative effort to deal with sentencing disparity.”5) However, 
the roots of the SRA and of federal sentencing reform can be traced back to 
the twin American themes of progressivism and populism as reflected in a 
myriad of twentieth century legal reform movements.6) In this 
characterization, progressivism inspires the creation of expert agencies that, 
based on empirical research, form public policy and, contrastingly, 
populism favors the use of common sense and public sentiment in the 
formation of public policy.
3) Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) 
[codified in 18 U.S.C.A. §§991(b), 994(a)(1)-(2) (1988)]. Between 1984 and 1987, the United 
States Sentencing Commission crafted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Since Congress did 
not object to the guidelines, they became effective on November 1, 1987 (28 U.S.C.A. §994 
(1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).
4) S. 2699, 1st Sess. (1975).
5) S. Rep., 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975).
6) Brooks, Karl, Sentencing Reform in Historical Context: The Progressive Vision of 
Sentencing Commissions (2002) (Paper originally presented at the Society for History in the 
Federal Government Annual Conference, April 11, 2002).
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The progressive impulse in criminal justice appears early in twentieth 
century America with the growth of indeterminate sentencing and the rise 
of the ideal of rehabilitation.7) In this approach, prisons are institutions 
where prisoners are transformed into law-abiding citizens. Parole and 
probation become central components of the approach and psychology and 
sociology experts design and implement medical treatment and 
supervision programs. Significantly, indeterminate sentences tailored to 
each offender’s individual circumstances become de rigueur. However, by 
the 1970’s the public sentiment towards rehabilitation had declined.8) 
Nonetheless, there remained a strong belief in the ability of expert 
commissions, and several proposals to rationalize the federal criminal code 
included proposals for sentencing reform.9) In the SRA this new progressive 
reform model replaced medical expertise with legal expertise that would 
calibrate the penalties to the seriousness of the crime10) and theoretical 
expertise that would optimize for the maximum control of crime with a 
minimal expenditure on criminal justice.11)
Accompanying the progressive spirited reforms in the SRA were 
populist inspired sections that reflected the distrust of both “experts” and 
politically unaccountable judges. Notably the sentencing guidelines 
significantly curtailed the discretions previously exercised by both judges 
and the United States Parole Commission which were viewed as “arbitrary 
and capricious” and an ineffective deterrent to crime.12) The SRA contained 
numerous detailed instructions to the Sentencing Commission, including 
7) Rothman, David, Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective 29, Crime and Delinquency 
631, 631-647 (1983).
8) Allen, Francis A., THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL 
PURPOSE (1981).
9) American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 
17, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1968). See also 
American Bar Association, Standards Relative to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, in 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1979). See 
also Dep’t of Justice, national commission on reform of the federal criminal laws. final 
report (1971). 
10) Von hirsch, Andrew, et al., THE COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES (1987).
11) Becker, Gary G., Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. pol. econ. 169, 169 
(1968).
12) S. REP. NO. 225, at 65 (1984).
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the elimination of sentences that “in many cases…[did] not accurately 
reflect the seriousness of the offense.”13) The Commission was also directed 
to consider “the community view of the gravity of the offense;” and “the 
public concern generated by the offense.”14) Finally, as a nod to the distrust 
of experts, Congress reserved to itself the opportunity to review the 
Commission’s work and to “modify or disapprove” of any of the 
Commission’s amendments to the guidelines.15)
2. Disparity, Severity and Discrimination
While the enactment of the SRA had at its root a growing public distrust 
in the infallibility of judicial discretion and perhaps the inevitable swing of 
the pendulum away from progressive ideals and towards populist ideals, 
there were two empirically demonstrated concerns that had arose in the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s regarding indeterminate sentencing. The first of 
these was the concern that judicial discretion gave rise to a “sentencing 
disparity” which occurred when similarly situated offenders received 
significantly disparate sentences. Contemporaneous studies showed that 
defendants with identical offenses and background circumstances 
frequently received significantly different sentences depending on the 
judge before which they appeared.16) In lay terms a defendant might have a 
“Hang-em High Harry” or a “Let-em Loose Larry.” This disparate 
treatment in the vital area of individual liberty struck many as an 
indefensible violation of the basic American core tenet of fairness.17)
Of even greater concern was evidence that disparate sentencing worked 
13) 28 U.S.C. § 994(c).
14) Id.
15) 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).
16) Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 101 harv. l. rev. 1938 (1988); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The 
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. crim. l. & criminology, 883 (1990).
17) Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. cinn. l. rev. 1, 2 (1972) (“Those of 
us whose profession is the law must not choose any longer to tolerate a regime of unreasoned, 
unconsidered caprice for exercising the most awful power of organized society, the power to 
take liberty … by process of what purports to be law”).
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to the disadvantage of minority groups.18) As early as 1933 studies revealed 
that judges were more lenient with offenders with whom they somehow 
identified than offenders viewed as somehow “different.”19) Often the 
offender’s race, sex, religion, income, education, occupation or other status 
characteristics affected the sentencing decision.20) There seemed to be an 
inextricable link between judicial discretion and racial discrimination. 
Evidence of this link was increasingly substantiated in a number of studies 
conducted in the early 1970’s. During this time a multitude of studies, 
driven by the public’s dissatisfaction with the federal sentencing scheme, 
were undertaken.21) As a result of this increased attention and advances in 
research methodology, studies revealed that disparity, and underlying 
discrimination, were at intolerable levels.22) While politically conservative 
reformers expressed some concern with this issue, it was the politically 
liberal reformers who made a goal out of eliminating sentencing disparity, 
and the underlying discriminatory effect, as a central tenet of their 
agenda.23)
18) Nagel, supra note 16, at 895 (“[d]iscretion seemed inextricably linked with 
discrimination.”).
19) Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 
J. crim. l. & criminology 811 (1933).
20) R. Martin, The Defendant and Criminal Justice, u. of texas Bull. No. 3437 (Bureau of 
Research in the Social Sciences No. 9, 1934).
21) Wilkins, Disparity in Dispositions: The Early Ideas and Application of the Guidelines, in 
SENTENCING REFORM 2, 11 (Wasik & Pease ed. 1987).
22) See, e.g., a. partridge & w.B. eldrige, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT 
TO THE JUDGES (1974); l. watkins, J. kress, d. gottfredson, J. caipin & a. gelman, SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDGICIAL DISCRETION, REPORT ON THE FFEASIBILITY STUDY (1978); William 
Austin & Thomas A. Williams, III, A Survey of Judges’ Responses to Simulated Legal Cases: 
Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 306 (1977); Shari Seidman 
Diamon & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 u. chi. l. 
rev. 109 (1975); Andrew Hopkins, Is There a Class Bias in Criminal Sentencing?, 42 am. soc. rev. 
176 (1977); Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 Judicature 121 (1975); 
Ilene Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, 4 
CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 91 (1983); Comment, Texas Sentencing 
Practices: A Statistical Study, 45 tex. l. rev. 471 (1967).
23) See, for example, Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law 
with Order, 16 am. crim. l. rev. 353, 357-59 (1979) (discussing studies on disparate 
sentencing). See also Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword to O’Donnell, Churgin and Curtis, TOWARD 
A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM, viii (1977).
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The second empirically founded concern was the severity of the 
sentences imposed for criminal offenses. Many reformers, especially the 
more conservative, believed that the indeterminate sentencing system 
resulted in sentences that were far too lenient. They argued that leniency in 
sentencing was attributable to the tendency of judges to coddle criminals,24) 
a view that was increasingly reflected in public opinion polls.25) For these 
reformers a sentencing commission, with the ability to limit judicial 
discretion and ensure that sentences matching the severity of the crime 
were imposed, was perceived as necessary.
For the politically more liberal minded, severity was also a concern. 
However, this concern revolved around the potential for misdirected 
Congressional involvement in sentencing. The example of California’s 
extensive sentencing reform enactment in the 1970’s fueled this concern.26) 
California’s legislative reform of sentencing resulted in a system scholars 
viewed as excessively harsh and needlessly complex.27) Thus liberal minded 
reformers envisioned a sentencing commission placed under the judiciary 
that was politically insulated from the crime-wave politics that was 
sweeping the country.
These two major concerns, severity and disparity, occupied both the 
liberal-minded and conservative-minded reformers. The more liberal 
reformers focused extensively on disparity and emphasized issues related 
24) Alan M. Dershowiztz, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, N.Y. times, Dec. 28, 1975, 
Magazine Section, at 7 (“[I]t seeems that the day of the indeterminate sentence is passing-- 
and with few regrets. While law-and-order conservatives remain persuaded that 
indeterminate sentencing is just one more form of coddling criminals, prisoners and their 
defenders outside the walls are complaining that it has resulted in too much power for parole 
boards and longer stays in prison… In short, a surprising consensus is emerging around the 
idea that it is time for a return to uniformity in sentencing”).
25) Nagel, supra note 16, at 884 (citing polls showing that, “on the whole, sentences served 
were considerably and consistently more lenient than public estimates of what ought to by the 
normative societal response”).
26) See Raymond I. Parnas & Michael B. Salerno, The Influence Behind, Substance and Impact 
of the New Determinate Sentencing Law in California, 11 U.C. davis l. rev. 29 (1978).
27) See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that 
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 notre dame l. rev. 21, 95 (2000) (“California’s 
experience with a legislature-centered sentencing system in the late 1970s confirmed for many 
reformers that crime-wave politics would often lead legislatures to enact an incoherent, 
uncoordinated and ever-increasing set of sentence”).
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to fairness and equality. The conservative-minded reformers focused more 
on the concern of severity and that “the punishment fit the crime.” 
However, both sets of reformers and both sets of policy concerns added to 
the rising tide of sentiment calling for the restructuring of the federal 
sentencing system.
3. The Legislative History of the SRA
The impetus for the SRA can be traced back to the creation in 1966 of the 
Brown Commission by President Lyndon Johnson.28) Subsequent hearings 
on the Brown Commission’s final report were heard before Congress in 
197129) with the first specific legislative proposals affecting federal 
sentencing being introduced in 1973.30) Progress was incremental until 
Senator Kennedy’s introduction in 1976 of Senate Bill 2699 in the 94th 
Congress and Congressional enactment of The Parole Commission and 
Reorganization Act of 1976. This act codified the Parole Commission 
program that had applied guidelines to all parole decisions beginning in 
1974. Thereafter, in the 95th Congress, Senators McClellan and Kennedy 
sponsored Senate Bill 1437 to re-codify federal criminal laws, restrict parole, 
and to establish a sentencing commission to draft sentencing guidelines. 
While an amended bill passed the Senate, the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice of the House Judiciary Committee reported a number of problems 
during hearings on the bill and took no further action. The bill “died in 
committee.”
During the following Congress, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 
was introduced. Similarly to Senate Bill 1437, it would have created a 
28) The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission) 
was formed in 1966 under the auspices of President Lyndon Johnson. The Commission 
published its Final Report in 1971 (United States GPO). NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971).
29) The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission): 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
92nd Cong., 129-514 (1971).
30) “The Criminal Justice Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1973” was introduced 
by Senators McClellan, Ervin, and Hruska. S. 1, 93rd Cong., §§1-4A1-A5 (1973). “The Criminal 
Code Reform Act of 1973” was introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan on behalf of the 
Nixon Administration, S. 1400, 93rd Cong., §§ 2001-2402 (1973).
 Sentencing Guidelines in South Korea   |  119No. 1: 2010
sentencing commission, however this bill would have abolished parole and 
extended the terms of supervised releases. The House Judiciary Committee 
approved a sentencing bill that proposed sentencing guidelines 
promulgation by a seven-member, part-time, Judicial Conference 
Committee on Sentencing.31) However, neither the House nor the Senate 
acted on this version of the legislation. Two years later in the 97th Congress, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a comprehensive criminal code 
revision bill, but no Senate action occurred on the proposal.32) At the same 
time a nearly identical bill passed the Senate but was deleted from the 
House version of the bill.33)
Finally, in the 98th Congress Senators Strom Thurmond and Paul Laxalt 
introduced Senate Bill 829, a comprehensive crime control legislation that 
contained sentencing reforms as Title II. The Senate Judiciary Committee 
held hearings and eventually broke the bill into several bills, including 
Senate Bill 1762, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983. This 
comprehensive act contained a major section on sentencing reform. Also 
emerging from the judiciary committee was Senate Bill 668, a bill by 
Senator Kennedy that was virtually identical to Title II of the crime control 
legislation. Both of these bills passed the Senate in 1984.
In the House during the 98th Congress, H.R. 6012, as reported out by the 
House Judiciary Committee was considered. This bill called for determinate 
parole terms and the creation of a part-time commission within the Judicial 
Conference to draft advisory sentencing guidelines. However, the bill was 
not considered by the full House, again “dying in committee.”
During the three Congresses that followed Senator Kennedy’s initial 
introduction of the legislation addressing the need for a sentencing 
commission, the Senate continued to regard the sentencing guideline 
concept as an integral part of any effort to reform the federal criminal laws 
and, due to the extended legislative process, the proposal gained broad 
bi-partisan support. However, in the House, the House Judiciary 
Committee leadership remained less than enthusiastic about the worth of 
the legislation. This concern heightened as each successive Senate recast the 
31) H.R. 6915, 96th Cong. (1980).
32) S. 1630, 97th Cong. (1982).
33) S. 2572, 97th Cong. (1982).
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legislation and progressively tightened the intended guidelines constraints 
on judicial discretion and decreased the relative influence of the Judiciary 
while increasing the role of the Executive Branch over the construction of 
the guidelines.
Nonetheless, in the second session of the 98th Congress an amended 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act was made a part of a continuing 
appropriations bill and passed by both chambers of Congress. The Act was 
signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on October 12, 1984. While the 
Act enjoyed strong bi-partisan support in the Senate, where it passed on a 
vote of ninety-nine to one,34) in the House, the Senate-passed bill was 
passed without amendment, and over the opposition of the House 
Judiciary Committee leadership, as a rider on a continuing appropriations 
bill.35) Nonetheless this method of House passage did not result in any 
significant impediment to the actions of the Sentencing Commission or the 
implementations of its proposed guidelines.
4. The SRA in Action: Disparity, Severity, Olis and Thurston
Pursuant to statutory authority the Sentencing Commission regular 
reviews and revises the sentencing guidelines and prepares a written report 
assessing the operation and effectiveness of the sentencing guidelines.36) 
These reports have shown a significant reduction in disparity and a 
significant increase in severity after the effective date of the sentencing 
guidelines. Despite that success, the SRA is a significant transference of 
power from the judiciary to the prosecution.37) The effects of this 
34) Senator Charles Mathias opposed passage of the SRA solely on the issue of mandatory 
versus recommended guidelines.
35) See generally U.S. sentencing comm’n, supplementary report on the initial sentencing 
guidelines and policy statements 1-8 (1987); William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton, and 
John R. Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing 
Disparity Problem, 2 crim. l. forum 355 (1991).
36) 28 U.S.C.A. §994 (o).
37) The Senate Judiciary Committee received testimony from Professor Stephen 
Schulhofer concerning the circumvention of the guidelines by prosecutors via plea 
bargaining. S. REP. No. 225, at 66 (1983). While the Sentencing Commission attempted to 
address this problem through study and possible further regulations regarding plea 
bargaining, the Sentencing Commission, which is placed in the Judicial Branch, cannot dictate 
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transference of power is arguable deleterious to the exercise of a citizen’s 
right to a trial by one’s peers.38)
Sentencing guidelines were enacted with the twin goals of reducing 
sentencing disparity and increasing sentencing severity. As an ever greater 
number of defendants received disparate and/or unjustifiable harsh 
sentences, cracks began to appear in the mandatory sentencing schemes at 
both the federal and state level. Over time the mandatory character of the 
guidelines gave rise to individual cases where the severity of the sentence 
imposed shocked the public‘s notions of fairness and equity. The pendulum 
began to swing back towards the necessity for greater judicial discretion.39) 
Three areas in particular were demonstrative of the growing disparity and 
excessive severity of the federal sentencing guidelines. First, the 
disproportionate sentences received for crack cocaine as compared to 
cocaine, second the excessive penalties in the white collar arena, and, 
finally, the excessive power of the prosecution to penalize an individual 
exercising the right to a jury trial.
1) Five Years for Five Grams: Crack Cocaine Sentencing
Crack cocaine entered the public awareness in the 1980s and quickly 
garnered extensive media coverage, partly due to the exponential growth of 
the crack cocaine market. The appeal of crack cocaine came from its cheap 
price which, for the first time, made cocaine accessible to every socio-
economic class. Crack cocaine quickly spread into urban and suburban 
households and the media used words like “epidemic” and “crisis” when 
discussing the issue. The political hysteria that ensued led to the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 which enacted some of the harshest mandatory 
sentencing guidelines for low level drug offenses and created drastically 
to a United States Attorney, who lies within the Executive Branch, what counts to charge.
38) See infra Section IE.
39) See, e.g., Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y.L.J., 2 (1992): 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. chi. 
l. rev. 901 (1991); Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The 
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 stan. l. & pol’y rev. 93 (1993) (“[B]arely a 
decade since the…reforms became effective, many judges, lawyers and scholars contend that 
the federal sentencing laws and practices are now as bad as, or even worse than, ever”).
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different sentencing regimes for powder cocaine and crack cocaine.40) The 
result was that defendants possessing over five grams of crack cocaine 
received a minimum five year sentence in federal prison.41) A defendant 
would need to possess over five hundred grams of power cocaine to receive 
the same mandatory minimum sentence.42) This 100:1 ratio between crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine became the source of vast racial disparities in 
sentencing over the next two decades.
United States government data on drug use rates reports that 
approximately two-thirds of drug users are Caucasian or Hispanic. The 
data shows the same percentages apply for cocaine usage overall although 
substantially more Blacks use crack cocaine. Due to the preference for crack 
cocaine among Black users, Blacks have been disproportionately sentenced 
to prison for cocaine usage. This is almost entirely a result of the mandatory 
sentencing scheme for crack cocaine possession and trafficking. In 1994, 
84.5 percent of crack cocaine possession convictions were for Blacks, only 
10.3% for Caucasians and 5.2% for Hispanics.43) For crack cocaine trafficking 
offenses, 88.3% of offenders sentenced were Blacks, 7.1% were Hispanics 
and 4.1% were Caucasian.44) For powder cocaine offender sentencing was 
more in line with general drug usage statistics; 58% of offenders sentenced 
for possession were Caucasian, 26.7% Black, and 15% Hispanic.45) Offenders 
sentenced for trafficking powder cocaine were 39.3% Hispanic, 32% 
Caucasian and 27.4% Black, also in line with usage statistics.46) By 2006 the 
figures for Black offenders remained at 81.8% of all offenders sentenced for 
crack cocaine offenses.47) Due to the low level of crack cocaine possession 
40) Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
41) 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), b(1)(B). Five grams of crack cocaine yields approximately 10 to 
50 doses. united states sentencing commission, report to congress: cocaine and federal 
sentencing policy 73 (2007).
42) 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), b(1)(B). Five hundred grams of powder cocaine yields between 
2,500 and 5,000 doses. united states sentencing commission, report to congress: cocaine and 
federal sentencing policy 73 (2007).
43) united states sentencing commission, special report to congress: cocaine and federal 




47) united states sentencing commission, report to congress: cocaine and federal 
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necessary to incur a five year mandatory minimum sentence, during the 
period from 1994 to 2003 the average time served by Blacks for drug 
offenses increased by 62 percent as compared to an increase of only 17% for 
Caucasian drug defenders.48) As of 2006, Blacks were serving an average of 
58.7 months in prison for non-violent drug offenses while Caucasians were 
serving an average of 61.7 months for violent offenses including murder, 
rape, and armed robbery.49)
This extreme racial disparity drew heavy criticism from commentators, 
media, and, most notably, from the United States Sentencing Commission. 
The Commission reported in 2004 that “[r]evising the crack cocaine 
thresholds would better reduce the [sentencing] gap than any other single 
policy change, and it would dramatically improve the fairness of the 
federal sentencing system.”50) Further, the Commission stated that even “[p]
erceived improper racial disparity fosters disrespect for and lack of 
confidence in the criminal justice system.”51) Over a period of greater than 
twenty years the Commission repeatedly asked for a reduction in the ratio 
between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses. Finally on August 3, 
2010, President Barack Obama signed a law changing the ratio to 18:1. As a 
result of this, an offender must now possess approximately 28 grams of 
crack cocaine to trigger the mandatory five year minimum penalty. This is 
the first time in the history of the United States that a law has been passed 
lessening a mandatory minimum sentence and that fact, by itself, 
demonstrates the severe problem that came from disparate sentencing 
under the crack cocaine regime.
sentencing policy 15 (2007).
48) Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 1994 85 (Table 6.11) 
(Mar. 1998); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2003 112 (Table 
7.16) (Oct. 2004).
49) Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2003 112 (Table 7.16) 
(Oct. 2004).
50) united states sentencing commission, fifteen years of guidelines sentencing 132 
(2004).
51) united states sentencing commission, report to congress, cocaine and federal 
sentencing policy 103 (2002).
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2) White Collar Crime: The Case of Jamie Olis
In 2001, Jamie Olis, a 38 year old Korean-American father, at the 
direction of his boss and a colleague used a “special purpose entity” to 
temporarily increase the operating cash flow at his publicly traded 
company. At the time the rules governing “special use entities” were fuzzy 
and, while the particular method used by Mr. Olis was accepted under 
standard accounting rules, the addition of various side agreements 
rendered the scheme in violation of sections of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. Eventually the company at which Mr. Olis worked was forced to 
restate its earnings. This restatement of earnings initiated a precipitous 
drop in the price of the publicly traded stock. By themselves these facts do 
not seem exceptional, but the resulting prosecution, the sentence imposed, 
and the circumstances of Mr. Olis’ life brought this case to the attention of 
the media and the public.52)
The story of Jamie Olis’ life before his involvement in Project Alpha was 
an embodiment of the American dream. As the illegitimate son of a South 
Korean prostitute impregnated by an American military soldier on tour in 
South Korea he was fated to life as an impoverished outcast in his home 
country. In the hope for a better life Jamie emigrated with his mother to 
Texas. However, once in America he endured physical abuse from a second 
American soldier with whom his mother was romantically involved. His 
life eventually improved when his mother remarried and his step-father 
adopted him and helped guide the young man. Over time Mr. Olis turned 
his life story into the American dream; marrying his college sweetheart, 
and becoming a C.P.A. and an attorney. By the time of his involvement in 
the “special use entity” he was 35 years old and a mid-level executive of a 
high flying energy company.
Mr. Olis’ troubles began in 2001 when he, as the senior director of tax 
planning at Dynegy, Incorporated, and under the direction of his boss, 
initiated Project Alpha.53) At that time, senior management at Dynegy was 
52) Henry Blodget, Zero to Life: The Injustice of White-Collar Sentencing Rules, slate (May 6, 
2004) at http://www.slate.com/id/2100055.
53) See Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff v. Gene S. Foster, Jamie Olis, Helen 
C. Sharkey, Defendants, 2003 WL 22331369 (Trial Proceeding) (No. 03-CR-217). Complaint 
dated June 12, 2003 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
(hereinafter “SEC Complaint”) at section i.
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looking for methods to increase operating cash flow through inventive 
energy trading activities. This need arose due to expressed concerns by the 
investment community over Dynegy’s widening gap between its net 
income and operating cash flow due to mark-to-market accounting. Project 
Alpha was a special use entity arrangement which converted cash from 
financing income into cash flow that was included in Dynegy’s public 
statements as cash from operating income.54) This restatement substantially 
boosted Dynegy’s cash from operating income and, as a result, its stock 
price.
However, during the period of Project Alpha’s existence, Dynegy 
engaged in various derivative transactions, including commodity price 
swaps and interest rate swaps, linked to Project Alpha’s underlying energy 
trading activity.55) These derivative transactions essentially eliminated any 
risk for Dynegy or its co-investors as regarded the underlying trading 
activities and effectively turned the trading activities into a financing 
arrangement. Nonetheless, Mr. Olis and his co-conspirators at Dynegy 
knowingly and intentionally concealed the existence of the derivative 
transactions from the accounting firm which issued the report for the 
Securities Exchange Commission.56) This resulted in the accounting firm 
including nearly $300 million dollars as cash from operating income in 2001 
public statements which should have been listed as cash from financing.57) 
Concealing material facts which affect statements made in public releases is 
fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.58)
In 2002, when the accounting firm became aware of the derivative 
transactions, Dynegy was forced to restate the Project Alpha earnings as 
cash flow from financing operations and not as cash from operating 
54) See Dynegy 2001 Form 10K filed on Mar. 13, 2002 with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Accession Number: 0000912057-02-009822. Therein Dynegy reported $290 
million in operating cash flow attributable to Alpha. This amounted to approximately 36% of 
Dynegy’s reported cash flow from operations in 2001.
55) Supra note 53. See also, SEC Complaint at sections iii and xxxii.
56) Supra note 53. See also, SEC Complaint at section xxxv and sections xli to xliv.
57) Supra note 54.
58) Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 of the 
Regulations promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
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income.59) This restatement precipitated a substantial drop in the price of 
the publicly traded stock. As summarized by the sentencing judge, the drop 
in share price caused a loss of approximately $105 million for the 
investment arm of the University of California Retirement System.60) Based 
on the guidelines promulgated by the federal sentencing commission, Olis’ 
base level offense of 6 was enhanced by 26.5 points on this factor alone. The 
judge then added an additional 8 points because there were more than fifty 
victims of the fraud, the fraud was via the use of a sophisticated means, and 
that Mr. Olis had used a special skill in committing the fraud. This resulted 
in a final enhanced offense level adjustment of 34.5 which resulted in a total 
offense figure of 40.61)
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, an adjusted offense level of 40 
for a first-time offender resulted in an incarceration range of 292 to 365 
months. The prosecutor requested the lowest possible sentence which the 
judge complied with, thus sentencing Mr. Olis for 24 years and 4 months in 
federal incarceration.62) Subsequent to sentencing Mr. Olis’ defense attorney 
and the media in general expressed dismay and shock at the results under 
the federal sentencing guidelines.63) Mr. Olis’ district court judge stated, 
“Let me just say that I take no pleasure in sentencing you to 292 months, 
but my job is to follow the law.”64) In comparison to the twenty-four years 
received by Mr. Olis, the median term in 2004 for state level conviction of 
59) Form 8-K filed on Nov. 15, 2002 with the Securities Exchange Commission.
60) U.S. v. Jamie Olis, 429 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Circuit, 2005).
61) Id. at 543.
62) On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, based on a re-computation of the loss due to 
fraud. United States v. Olis, 429 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). The district court resentenced Olis on 
September 22, 2006 to a more reasonable six-year term, principally because the Sentencing 
Guidelines were no longer mandatory under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See infra Section IE. Nonetheless, the six year term is 
roughly equivalent to a pre-Sentencing Guidelines sentence of eighteen years, a particular 
severe term for Mr. Olis considering his offense and his background.
63) See James K. Glassman, Regulatory Hysteria, scripps howard news service, Mar. 29, 
2004.
64) U.S. v. Jamie Olis, 2004 WL 3756361 (S.D. Tex., Mar 24, 2004) Trial Transcript (No. 
H-03-217-01) in which the judge continued, “[t]he role of a district judge, therefore, is not to 
act as a roving chancellor in equity meting out individual justice as he or she sees fit. It is to 
conscientiously follow the letter and spirit of the law. Among the laws the Court is required to 
follow are the federal sentencing guidelines” (Trial Transcript at 14-15).
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murder was thirteen years; for drug trafficking, four years; and for sexual 
abuse, three years.65)
3) Plea Bargaining Disparity: The Case of William Thurston
William Thurston was the Regional and Senior Vice President66) of a 
Massachusetts corporation (hereinafter “Damon”) that provided clinical 
laboratory testing services to hospitals, health maintenance organizations, 
physicians and patients nationwide. In the 1980’s Damon earned 
approximately thirty percent (30%) of its revenue from Medicare, a 
government insurance program for the elderly administered by the Health 
Care Financing Administration (“HCFA“).67)
In late 1987, HCFA announced that as of April 1, 1988, Medicare would 
reduce the fees paid to laboratories, including Damon, for providing 
clinical services to beneficiaries.68) Immediately after the announcement 
there were corporate discussions at Damon, including Mr. Thurston, 
regarding the reduction in fees and potential methods of recouping the 
losses. As a result of these discussions, Damon added a ferritin blood test69) 
to a standard LabScan, a panel of more than a dozen blood chemistry tests 
performed on a single machine. The ferritin test was performed on a 
separate machine, was medically necessary in only about one percent of the 
cases, and was billed separately to Medicare but not to the doctor. Thurston 
and his fellow executives endeavored to prevent the doctors ordering the 
tests from becoming aware of the separate charges to Medicare or that the 
LabScan panel could be ordered without the ferritin test.70) Over the next 
five years, the change to the LabScan blood panel more than offset the loss 
65) Glassman, supra note 63.
66) Thurston served as Regional Vice President of Damon from 1987 to 1990. He was 
promoted to Senior Vice President of Operations in 1990 to 1993.
67) Medicare was created under The Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, 
79 Stat.286, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1395-1395ccc. Medicaid was created under The 
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343, codified as amended at 42 U.
S.C. 1396-1396v.
68) U.S. v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2004).
69) The ferritin iron test measures the number of atoms per molecule of circulating 
ferritin. Ferritin is a binding protein that delivers iron to iron storage cells. U.S. v. Thurston, 
358 F.2d 51, at FN2 (2004).
70) U.S. v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 56 (2004).
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fees from Medicare’s reduction in the amount paid for lab services.71)
On January 22, 1998, a thirty-nine paragraph single-count indictment 
charged Thurston and three other former Damon executives with 
conspiring to defraud HCFA by causing physicians to unknowingly and 
unnecessarily order extra tests by adding the ferritin test to the pre-existing 
panel of diagnostic blood tests.72) The indictment charged that a conspiracy 
existed from July 1987 to August 1993. Mr. Thurston’s co-conspirator, the 
president of the company, reached a plea agreement with the prosecution 
and was sentenced to three years probation.73) After conclusion of trial, the 
jury found Mr. Thurston guilty of conspiracy to defraud the federal 
government. The penalty under the law that Thurston was charged with 
violating prescribed a maximum penalty of sixty months, or five years in 
prison.74) Despite this maximum penalty prescribed under the statute, the 
penalty prescribed under the federal sentencing guidelines for a first-time 
offender called for a sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. The 
government, bound by the statutory maximum and disregarding Mr. 
Thurston‘s co-conspirators probationary sentence, requested the judge to 
sentence Mr. Thurston to the maximum period of sixty months in federal 
prison.
Despite the government’s request for the maximum penalty, and 
despite the sentencing guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Thurston 
to three months’ imprisonment (to be served in a halfway house), followed 
by two years of supervised release, the first three months of which were to 
be served under house arrest. The district court also imposed a one 
hundred dollar special assessment and no fine. This sentence, based 
71) At trial the prosecution introduced evidence demonstrating fees in excess of $5 
million dollars solely attributable to fees from unnecessary ferritin tests. After pleading guilty, 
Damon paid a fine of $35,273,141 and, pursuant to a civil settlement, paid reimbursement of 
$83,756,904 to the United States and the state Medicaid programs.
72) Id. at 60.
73) Id. at 55. (“[T]he company president, Joseph Isola, who had pled nolo contendere and 
assisted the government…[received] three years’ probation”).
74) 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against 
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for 
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, 
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both”). Pub. L. 
103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(L), 108 Stat. 2147.
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primarily on the sentence Mr. Thurston’s co-conspirator received under a 
plea bargain, outraged the prosecution, who appealed. The prosecution 
argued on appeal that the district court lacked the power to grant a 
downward departure. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
with the prosecution and imposed a sixty-month sentence on Mr. Thurston 
to be served in federal prison.75) Over the next four years Mr. Thurston 
repeated appealed to the United States Supreme Court and, finally, in 2008 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, after being twice reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, agreed with the District Court’s original sentence.76)
4) United States v. Booker: Returning Sentencing Discretion to the Courts 
While Mr. Olis, Mr. Thurston and a multitude of Black offenders were 
being sentenced to years and decades of incarceration under the federal 
sentencing guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court was gradually developing 
its jurisprudence concerning the constitutional right to a jury trial contained 
in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This case law began with 
the case of Apprendi,77) a case challenging judicial fact-finding used during 
sentencing decisions.
In Apprendi the defendant was convicted of a firearms violation after 
he fired several shots into the home of a Black family. During questioning 
the defendant had stated that he did not want the family in his 
neighborhood because of their race, however, he later withdrew this 
statement. After the defendant pled guilty, the trial court found, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated 
and, under a hate-crime enhancement statute, increased defendant’s 
sentence above the statutory maximum of ten years, to impose a sentence of 
twelve years. The state appellate court and the state supreme court upheld 
the sentence and rejected defendant’s claim that the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
75) U.S. v. Thurston, 351 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2004).
76) U.S. v. Thurston, 544 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2008). The U.S. Supreme Court’s reversal of the 
First Circuit was based on its decision in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
77) U.S. v. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, joined by 
Justices Souter, Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg.
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requires, for state law sentencing purposes, that a bias finding be proved to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
lower courts stating that the U.S. Constitution required any fact that 
increased a period of incarceration beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum for that crime, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be 
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.78)
Over the next four years, Apprendi was further interpreted, limited and 
explained by the Supreme Court, and then, in 2004, the Supreme Court 
decided Blakely v. Washington.79) In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that 
under Washington State’s determinate sentencing scheme the “statutory 
maximum” is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.80) Therefore, the defendant’s sentence could not be lengthened 
beyond the 49 to 53 month statutory standard range for the offense despite 
the fact that the statutory maximum under the law was 10 years.81) Prior to 
Blakely the federal circuit courts of appeals had determined that the 
maximum sentence was the maximum penalty set forth in the statute under 
which a defendant was convicted.82) The Supreme Court’s redefinition of 
“statutory maximum” to mean the top of the guidelines sentencing range 
mandated by the particular facts of a defendant’s case called into question 
the reasoning behind the circuit court decisions.
The subsequent upheaval created in the federal courts by the Blakely 
decision forced the Supreme Court to quickly address the issue.83) On 
78) Id. at 476-478.
79) Washington v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
80) Id. at 303.
81) Id. at 303-304.
82) See United States v. Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Garcia, 240 F.3d 180 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3rd Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160 (5th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Lawrence, 308 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Knox, 301 
F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Walker, 324 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Ochoa, 311 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jackson, 204 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Harris, 244 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1043 
(D.C.Cir. 2001).
83) Subsequent to Blakely two circuit courts declared that the federal sentencing 
guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004) 
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August 2, 2004, the Supreme Court accepted for expedited review two 
federal sentencing guidelines cases, United States v. Booker84) and United State 
v. Fanfan,85) in order to clarify to what extent the Blakely decision affected 
the federal sentencing guidelines. The first issue to be determined by the 
Court was whether a Sixth Amendment violation occurred if a sentencing 
judge used, in determining sentence, facts that were not found by the jury 
or admitted by the defendant. If a Sixth Amendment violation were found, 
then the second issue concerned whether the sentencing guidelines as a 
whole were to be inapplicable so that a sentencing court would be required 
to use its own discretion when sentencing an offender. Such discretion 
being only limited by the maximum and minimum set forth under the 
statute for the offense under which the defendant was convicted.86)
In addressing whether there was a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury, the Court reviewed its decisions in Apprendi and 
Blakely as well as other peripherally important cases. In its decision the 
Court focused on a contemporaneous trend by which the legislature placed 
increasing emphasis on sentence enhancement facts. In almost all cases, 
these sentence enhancement facts were not required to be raised before trial 
or to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus the judge, and not the 
jury, was increasingly called upon to determine the upper limits of 
sentencing. The Court saw this trend as reducing the importance of the 
right to trial by jury and worried as to how the jury would be able to 
maintain its position between the individual defendant and power of 
government in this type of sentencing regime.87) Ultimately the Court 
decided that it must follow the Apprendi reasoning and “preserve Sixth 
Amendment substance.”88)
and United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004). Simultaneously five other circuit 
courts held Blakely did not affect the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines. See 
United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (2nd 
Cir. 2004); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Koch 383 
F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004); and United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004).
84) 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
85) 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Note: Fanfan was consolidated with Booker.
86) United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229, n.1.
87) Id. at 237.
88) Id.
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In a rare double majority opinion, a separate majority of Justices, in an 
opinion authored by Justice Breyer, addressed the issue of severability of 
the sentencing guidelines.89) In this second majority, the Court excised two 
provisions from the federal sentencing guidelines that made the guidelines 
mandatory. In excising these provisions the Court decided that other 
remedies would fail to preserve the intent of Congress in enacting the SRA. 
In conclusion the Court stated “[s]o modified, the Federal Sentencing Act…
makes the Guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to 
consider Guidelines ranges… but it permit’s the court to tailor the sentence 
in light of other statutory concerns as well.”90)
With the SRA as the beginning bookend and, the aptly named case of 
Booker as the ending bookend, the twenty year experiment in mandatory 
sentencing was ended. While subsequent to Booker federal district and 
circuit courts have generally followed the sentencing guidelines, the ability 
to depart from the guidelines has rebalanced the power between the 
judiciary and the prosecution. The ability to examine the seven factors 
listed in Title 18 of the U.S. Code enables judges to more fully fulfill their 
role.91)
II. South Korea
As the United States Supreme Court was ending a twenty year 
legislative experiment in mandatory sentencing, the South Korean 
legislature was beginning the process of enacting legislation that would 
lead to strict sentencing guidelines for South Korea. The process leading to 
this legislation is the focus of this section. To conclude this article will 
discuss, taking into account the United States’ experience, factors that the 
89) Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy and Ginsburg 
formed the majority that fashioned the remedy.
90) United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245. Note that 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) lists seven 
factors, including the guidelines and policy statements, that must be taken into consideration 
in imposing a sentence.
91) See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits 
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 yale l.J. 1681 (1992) for an early discussion of the 
appropriate role of the Guidelines in sentencing decisions.
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South Korean sentencing commission might consider in establishing the 
South Korean sentencing guidelines.
1. The History of the Sentencing Commission in South Korea
Discussions regarding the establishment of a sentencing commission 
between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court began in August of 2003. However, it took until December 
of 2006 before the Korean National Assembly revised the Court 
Organization Act (“COA”) and established the Korean Sentencing 
Commission.92) Similar to the U.S., the Korean Sentencing Commission is 
located within the judiciary, and, similar to the U.S., it performs its 
functions independent of the judiciary.93) The Korean Sentencing 
Commission, again like the U.S., is minimally described in the legislation 
authorizing its existence. The COA consists of twelve articles regarding 
reform. Most of the implementation of the goals of the COA are left to the 
sentencing commission. Thus, the commission is responsible for setting and 
revising sentencing guidelines and issuing regular reports on sentencing 
policy and statistics. The goal of the commission is to establish fair and 
objective sentencing and, thereby, restore the public confidence in the 
judiciary.
The Korean Sentencing Commission is composed of thirteen 
commissioners each appointed to a two year term, subject to unlimited 
reappointment.94) The Chief Justice of the Korean Supreme Court appoints 
all commissioners. Under the COA the sentencing commission is composed 
of one chairperson, four judges, two public prosecutors (recommended by 
the Ministry of Justice), two defense attorneys (recommended by the 
president of the Korean Bar Association), two law professors and two 
persons with expertise and experience in Korean criminal law.95) The result 
of this structure is that the commission is dominated by the judiciary and its 
interests.
92) Amendment to the Court Organization Act, art. 81-2 to 81-14, effective April 27, 2007.
93) Id. at art. 81-2, para 3.
94) Id.
95) Id. at art. 81-3.
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Pursuant to the COA, the commission issued its first set of sentencing 
guidelines on April 24, 2009. These became effective on July 1, 2009. This 
first set of guidelines encompassed eight areas of criminal conduct deemed 
to be most in need of uniform enforcement.96) The sentencing commission 
guidelines issued are not mandatory, however judges are required to 
strictly adhere to the guidelines when imposing criminal sentences and any 
departure from the guidelines must be justified pursuant to specific 
exception and set forth in a written decision.
2. South Korea Demographics and Sentencing Disparity
These guidelines arose because many commentators, politicians and 
judges argue the same issues that the United States faced in the late 1970s, 
those of sentencing disparity and sentencing leniency, face South Korea 
today. Public perception in South Korea supports the argument regarding 
sentencing leniency. The sentencing commission’s survey in 2007 showed 
that greater than fifty-nine percent of the public thought that excessive 
leniency existed in sentencing decisions. Among members of the Korean 
Bar, that percentage rose to over seventy-two percent.97) Of particular note 
is the tendency in South Korea to grant downward adjustments to prison 
sentences due to the mitigating factors, including alcohol and remorse. 
Downward adjustments due to alcohol in particular have resulted in 
substantial public outcry, along with lenient sentences for repeat offenders 
and those in positions of authority.98) Thus sentencing leniency is a 
legitimate issue facing the South Korean judiciary, however, the debate is 
whether a sentencing commission is necessary to address leniency without 
96) These guidelines cover the following types of crimes: homicides, bribery, sex crimes, 
perjury, slandering (false accusation), embezzlement, misappropriation, and robbery.
97) korean sentencing commission, the annual report to the national assemBly of 2007, 
164.
98) See Court Ruling on Rapist Draws Anger, korea times, Nov. 24, 2008 (detailing public 
outcry when family that raped teenage daughter receives suspended sentences and daughter 
is returned to family for care due to her disability). See also Light Jail Term for Children’s Rapist 
Enrages Koreans, korea times, Mar. 30, 2010 (discussing public outcry over 12-year sentence for 
repeat child sex offender). See also Pardons granted to tycoons and pols, Joongang daily, Aug. 13, 
2008 (discussing pardoning of high profile offenders including Hyundai Motor Chaiman 
Chung Mong-koo, SK Chairman Chey Tae-won and Hanwha Chairman Kim Seung-youn).
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additional issues.
Sentencing disparity combined with sentencing leniency could create 
the necessary environment in which a sentencing commission is necessary. 
However, the U.S. disparity issue, which was a pressing concern due to 
disparate treatment among ethnic and racial groups, is unknown in South 
Korea. South Korean demographics as of 2010 show a still virtually 
homogenous nation, and an even more homogenous offender class. Foreign 
nationalities comprise only 2.7% of the population99) while they comprise a 
mere 1.6% of those accused of criminal activity. The numbers are even 
starker when looking at violent crimes, of which a mere 0.7% were 
committed by an offender not of Korean ethnicity.100) These statistics 
demonstrate that any individual Korean judge, and the Korean judiciary in 
general, is rarely, if ever, required to sentence an offender with a different 
ethnic or racial background.101) Thus, any sentencing disparity issue 
involving judges sentencing offenders with whom they identify more 
lightly than those they regard as different is effectively non-existent. The 
sentencing commission’s annual report also showed that there was a dearth 
of official statistics regarding regional disparities or disparities among 
99) Ministry of Public Administration and Security, May 2010 (There are currently 
1,106,884 foreigners residing in the nation, accounting for 2.2 percent of the nation’s entire 
population of 49,593,665). Ethnic breakdown was as follows: Chinese: 624,994, 56.5%; 
Southeast Asians: 230,577, 21.2%; Americans: 59,870, 5.4%; Others 191,443; 17.2%. However, 
note that this survey included foreign-born Koreans in the totals, thus increasing the amount 
by an estimated 200,000. Note that this number does not include the estimated 225,273 
foreigners illegally residing in South Korea bring the foreigner population to 2.7%.
100) In August of 2010 the Korean National Police Agency released the following figures 
for violent crime committed by foreign offenders in 2009. Out of a total of 23,344 foreign 
criminals caught, violent offenders account for 7,812. Offense Numbers: Murder 103; Robbery 
260; Rape 126; Larceny 2,001; Assault 5,322. See http://www.fnn.co.kr/content.asp?aid=a60cc
76bc0e7425aba10ba548f3e6c6d. That the Korean citizen crime rate is several times higher than 
non-citizen resident crime rate is not controversial. See Oegukin Beomjoeyuleun Natjuman 
Geonsuneun Keuge Neuleo (Foreigner’s crime rate still low, but number rapidly increasing), chosun 
ilBo, July 9, 2008. Available at http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/07/09/ 
2008070900054.html. 
101) As of July 31, 2010 there were 1014 foreigners serving time in Korean prisons among 
a total inmate population of 47,110. See www.corrections.go.kr/HP/TCOR/cor_04/cor_0404/
cor_404010.jsp. At the end of 2009 there were 2,468 sitting judges in South Korea. Thus, a 
majority of judges have never sentenced a non-Korean defendant for a violent offense.
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judges in sentencing decisions.102) Combining the relative scarcity of foreign 
offenders in South Korea with the Ministry of Justice’s policy on expulsion 
of foreign convicts after completion of their sentence, the recidivism rate for 
foreigners in South Korea is similarly statistically non-existent.
Despite the current dearth of non-ethnic Korean criminal defendants in 
the South Korean courts, this situation will most likely change in the future. 
As of 2010 approximately 40% of marriages in the countryside are between 
Korean men and foreign wives, generally of Vietnamese or Pilipino 
ethnicity. Further, due to Korea’s economic success, there is a steadily 
increasing influx of southeast Asian workers. These workers come from 
rural areas of China and from undeveloped economies such as Vietnam 
and Mongolia. While arguably Mongolians share ethnicity with Koreans,103) 
the Korean population views Mongolians and other East Asian ethnicities 
as foreigners. Nonetheless, this influx of workers and the general increasing 
foreign population will undoubtedly result in a rise in the number of 
foreign defenders appearing before Korean courts. While the Korean media 
often extrapolates sensationally about a rise in the number of foreign 
offenders,104) it is statistically likely that the foreigner offense rate will 
eventually equal that of the Korean offense rate at 3.5%. Thus, as the 
number of foreigners and foreign descendants increase, the number of 
actual foreign defenders will also increase. At that time, and provided 
empirical evidence shows actual sentencing disparity between ethnic 
Korean offenders and non-ethnic offenders, a sentencing commission could 
be necessary.
3. “Jeon-Kwan-Ye-Woo”
Although a majority of judges in South Korea have never encountered 
racial disparity among the criminal offenders appearing in their courtroom, 
102) See korean sentencing commission, the annual report to the national assemBly of 
2007, 165.
103) See Barnes, gina l., THE RISE OF CIVILIZATION IN EAST ASIA: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF CHINA, 
KOREA AND JAPAN, 165 (1999). See also Saha N. and Tay J.S., Origin of the Koreans: a population 
genetic study, 88 am. J. phys. anthropol. 27-36 (1992).
104) See Oegukin Beomjoe GeupJeung (Foreigner crime rapidly increasing), chosun ilBo, 
Oct. 18, 2007.
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there is a potential for disparity arising from another factor. This is a unique 
feature of South Korean jurisprudence and is known as “Jeon-Kwan-Ye-
Woo.” Jeon-Kwan-Ye-Woo is a term used by the public to describe a 
perceived leniency granted to former prosecutors and judges when 
defending their first case as a defense attorney. Literally the term means to 
grant an honorable reception to one who held a former post as a judge or 
prosecutor. Thus the public believes that a criminal offender who is 
fortunate to hire such a former judge or prosecutor as their attorney is more 
likely to be acquitted or to receive a lesser sentence. Despite this public 
perception, judges and prosecutors strongly deny that this practice exists. 
Nonetheless, this perception contributes to the underlying distrust of the 
public in the judiciary.
While it cannot be shown that Jeon-Wwan-Ye-Woo is practiced by the 
judiciary, Korean culture is strongly based on relationships. Since January 
1, 1971 all individuals who have passed the Korean bar exam have been 
required to spend two years at the Judicial Research and Training Institute 
(“JRTI”). On completion of their studies at JRTI the graduates are either 
appointed as a judge or prosecutor or go into private practice. Thus every 
lawyer is a graduate of JRTI and a part of an elite and closely knit 
community.105) Further, many judges and prosecutors resign their positions 
in their late 40s or early 50s and go into private practice. Given the Korean 
cultural focus on the primacy of relationships it is natural that the Korean 
public believes these new defense attorneys will be given special 
consideration when trying a case before a former colleague.
III. Analysis
The U.S. sentencing guidelines were created in response to perceived 
racial disparities in sentencing as well as public perception of excessive 
sentence leniency. As has been shown, no statistically significant racial 
105) From 1971 to 1996 only 300 individuals per year passed the Korean bar exam. In 1997 
the number was 500. In 1998 and 1999 the number was 700. In 2000 and 2001 the number was 
800. And as of 2002 this number was increased to 1,000. See Judicial Research and Training 
Institute http://jrti.scourt.go.kr.
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disparities among criminal offenders yet exist in South Korea. Nonetheless, 
public perception in South Korea mirrors that of the U.S. public in the 1970s 
and, while the phenomenon of Jeon-Kwan-Ye-Woo may be a chimera, the 
public perception has resulted in a response from the government. 
However, this response must be a measured one, for societal demand for 
ever harsher punishment of criminals can lead to rigid enforcement 
schemes which eventually shock even those who originally supported such 
schemes. As in the United States, South Korea has embarked on a project to 
enact a broad set of sentencing guidelines. While to date the sentencing 
regime is not mandatory, deviations from the sentencing range are tightly 
curtailed and, therefore, the U.S. experience is relevant.
Sentencing guideline regimes have at their core the three primary goals 
of uniformity, proportionality and honesty. Moreover, when a sentencing 
guideline regime becomes too strict, power devolves from the judiciary to 
the prosecution. In the case of William Thurston described above, the goal 
of uniformity was violated when the prosecutors were free to grant his 
co-conspirator a suspended sentence under a plea bargain agreement while 
they simultaneously demanded that Mr. Thurston be sentenced to 5 years 
incarceration for the same offense.106) This disparity in sentences was not the 
result of any consideration of culpability or due to any criteria used in 
calculating Mr. Thurston’s sentence under the guidelines. Rather Mr. 
Thurston’s co-defendants were able to remove themselves from the 
application of the guidelines via plea bargaining, thus making themselves 
eligible for prosecutorial discretion. This discrepancy had the effect of 
punishing Mr. Thurston for his temerity in demanding a court decide his 
guilt rather than accept the heavy hand of the prosecutor. Likewise, the 
South Korea sentencing guidelines should address the issue of the power of 
the prosecutor’s office when reaching agreements with defendants outside 
the sentencing guidelines. The sentencing commission should also consider 
what results occur when prosecutors file excessive charges against 
defendants exercising their right to trial. A factor could be added that 
allows South Korean courts to consider co-defendants who have not been 
subject to the sentencing guidelines and to consider whether the 
106) See supra Section ID3.
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co-defendants sentences call for mitigation or aggravation of the defendant 
who has demanded that his innocence or guilt be decided by the court.
The second goal of a sentencing guidelines regime, proportionality, has 
at its root the concepts of retribution and justice. The more culpable a 
defendant, the more atrocious the offense, the greater the punishment 
invoked by the State. However, in the case of Mr. Olis, the finding of the 
amount of loss was the largest factor used in determining his sentence. The 
fact that one large institutional investor had seen a paper loss of over one 
hundred million dollars increased Mr. Olis’ sentence by more than 20 years 
despite the fact that multiple other factors, including simple market 
movement, could have attributed for this loss. Regardless of whether there 
were other factors that may have caused this investor’s loss, the criteria 
itself violates the proportionality goal. It simply cannot be concluded that 
using a third party’s loss on publicly traded stock as a criteria to impose 
sentence will achieve a goal of proportionality because of the volatility and 
unpredictability of financial markets. Another defendant committing the 
exact same act at a non-publicly traded company or a company with a 
lesser or greater market capitalization could receive a dramatically different 
sentence based on market events outside of the control of the offender. 
Thus, Mr. Olis’ sentence had nothing to do with the perceived wrongness 
of his conduct or his degree of culpability. The South Korea sentencing 
commission should also consider Mr. Olis’ case and consider carefully any 
criteria used in developing sentencing guidelines that may result in 
disproportionate results for offenders with equivalent culpability.
Finally, sentencing guidelines have a goal of honesty in sentencing. This 
reflects the public’s desire that offenders are sentenced to terms that are real 
and meaningful and not dependent on a indeterminate sentencing scheme. 
Before the U.S. sentencing guidelines were enacted offenders could receive 
various reductions in their time served once in the prison system. Often 
these reductions could result in an offender serving merely a third of the 
time to which the offender was actually sentenced. Once the U.S. guidelines 
were enacted the public could be sure that a defendant sentenced to ten 
years would actually serve ten years. However, the goal of honesty goes 
beyond merely assuring that an offender serve the time he was sentenced 
to by the court. Honesty must also encompass the fundamental policies of 
criminal justice, including general deterrence, specific deterrence, 
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rehabilitation, and retribution. Shifting to a more determinate sentencing 
structure enhances these fundamental policies. If a potential offender is 
cognizant of the consistency of the time actually served by similar 
offenders, there is more of a deterrent effect on such potential offender. 
Thus, in both case histories explored above this honesty was broken. 
Neither Mr. Thurston nor Mr. Olis would have been, or could have been, 
aware of the extensive time of incarceration to which they were exposing 
themselves by their conduct. At Mr. Olis’ sentencing hearing his 
experienced defense attorney stated he was “at a loss to understand” the 
sentence imposed under the guidelines, and found himself “speechless.”107) 
To avoid any such future problems in South Korea, the sentencing 
commission cognizance of these cases should inform the process of creating 
and reviewing its sentencing calculations. Calculations that may result in 
lengthy sentences that cannot be anticipated by offenders will not create 
any deterrence effect and will eventually serve to undermine the public’s 
faith in the sentencing guidelines. The South Korean sentencing 
commission has to reach a medium imposition where honesty in deterrent 
effect is satisfied while the public’s desire for appropriate punishment 
levels is also met. The U.S. experience is instructive in this regard.
Finally, the discrepancy between crack cocaine and powder cocaine 
sentencing regimes and the resultant harsh outcomes can aid the South 
Korean sentencing commission. The crack cocaine sentencing regime 
experience shows the inherent dangers of public outcry. Current South 
Korea public outcry is focused on perceived leniency in sentences for sex 
offenders and to a lesser extent on perceived foreign offenders.108) This 
outcry is leading to the imposition of harsh penalties for sex offenders and 
to increased regulation of foreign individuals living legally within South 
Korea. While the call for stronger sentencing of the sex offenders is 
arguably justifiable, recent enactments on the regulation of foreigners are in 
violation of South Korea’s duties under international agreements.109) 
107) United States v. Olis, H-03-CR-217 (S.D. Texas), Mar. 24, 2004 Tr. At 14-15.
108) See supra notes 98, 104 and accompanying text.
109) Some recent legislative enactments on the treatment of legal foreign residents are 
arguably in violation of the United Nations Agreement on Human Rights. See Joseph Amon, 
Blaming Foreigners, korea times, Mar. 12, 2009. (“The International Covenant on Civil and 
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Regardless of the similarity or differences between those two issues, the 
sentencing commission’s overarching duty is to gain understanding from 
the experience of the U.S. and to moderate the public outcry in South Korea 
in order to prevent similar excessive measures.
IV. Conclusion
The South Korean sentencing commission’s familiarity with some of the 
issues confronted by the U.S. during the last twenty years under its federal 
sentencing guideline regime will allow the members of the commission to 
perform their duties with greater sophistication. This familiarity will allow 
the commission to address potential problems proactively before these 
issues can undermine the effectiveness of the new sentencing regime. This 
article’s exposition of the experience of the U.S. and its comparison to South 
Korea’s current position will hopefully aid the commission and other 
readers in constructively critiquing South Korea’s current approach to 
sentencing guidelines.
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Political Rights (ICCPR), which South Korea has acceded to, guarantees everyone the right to 
equal protection of the law without discrimination, a provision interpreted to include barring 
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